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Abstract: In the philosophy of perception, representationalism is the view that all 
phenomenological differences among mental states are representational differences, in other 
words, differences in content. In this paper I defend an alternative view which I call external 
sortalism, inspired by traditional adverbialism, and according to which experiences are not 
essentially representational. The central idea is that the external world serves as a model for 
sorting, conceptualizing, and reasoning surrogatively about perceptual experience. On external 
sortalism, contents are construed as a kind of gloss on experiences themselves. We can retain 
what is attractive about representationalism, namely, that perceptual experiences can be 
evaluated for accuracy, without problematic commitment to the idea that they bear a substantive, 
representational relation to external objects and properties and that this relation determines the 
phenomenal character of experience. 
 
 
Imagine that you are looking at a red tomato. Your visual experience presents you with an object 
of determinate size, shape, and color. Of course, there may be nothing there – you may be 
hallucinating a tomato – or you may be looking at a green tomato in bad light. It is natural, at 
least for philosophers, to say that your visual experience represents a red tomato in front of you, 
and that the experience represents accurately only if there is such an object there; otherwise it 
misrepresents. This is what the leading philosophical account of perceptual experience – 
representationalism
1
 – would say. I don’t think there is anything wrong with speaking this way; 
indeed I think it is basically correct, but I don’t think that representationalism provides the most 
illuminating account of perceptual experience. In this paper I defend an alternative proposal, 
inspired by traditional adverbialism about perceptual experience. The view, which I call external 
sortalism, allows us to retain what is unobjectionable about representationalism – that perceptual 




 The view is sometimes called intentionalism. Proponents include Harmon, Tye, Lycan, 




1. Orthodox representationalism about perceptual experience 
Representationalism holds not only that experiences have content, but also that the content they 
have fully determines their phenomenal character, that is, what it is like for the subject to 
undergo the experience. So, for example, what it is like for you as you visually experience a ripe, 
red tomato is fully determined by the experience’s content, viz., what the experience ‘says’ about 
the way things are in front of you now.
2
  The experience has this content whether or not things 
are in fact that way, in other words, whether the experience is veridical or illusory. On this view, 
experiences are said to have their contents essentially – if a particular experience had a different 
content it would be a different type of experience.  
 Representationalism comes in various strengths. Intermodal theorists hold that 
phenomenal differences among sensory modalities – the difference, say, between seeing a plane 
flying overhead and hearing it overhead – are determined by a difference in content. Intramodal 
representationalists deny this, holding that phenomenal differences among experiences of 
different modalities are to be explained functionally rather than solely in terms of content. 
Unrestricted representationalism extends the thesis to bodily sensations such as pains and 
orgasm, and utterly unrestricted representationalism holds that any mental state with phenomenal 






 The content of the experience will only be imperfectly captured by a description used to 
attribute the experience. 
3





Representationalists typically hold unrestricted versions of the thesis.
4
 Byrne argues that 
restricted versions of representationalism are hard to defend: 
If there were an argument for intentionalism about visual experiences, why couldn’t it be 
adapted to the case of itches? Conversely, if a convincing counterexample to 
supervenience [of character on content] were produced that would raise the suspicion that 
counterexamples concerning other experiences with propositional contents (visual 
experiences, as it may be) are waiting in the wings. (2001, 205-206) 
Lycan 2015 points out that restricting the thesis to perceptual experiences would be ad hoc. If the 
representational content of a perceptual experience really explains its phenomenal character, as 
representationalists hold, then why should content not explain the phenomenal character of any 
mental state that has phenomenology? A restricted version of the thesis leaves the phenomenal 
character of the excluded states unexplained. 
 In what follows I hope to undermine even the weakest version of representationalism.
5
 I 
will focus first on experiences that are not patently intentional. I will argue that the ascription of 
representational content to bodily sensations and moods is best construed as playing a merely 
heuristic role. If this is right, and if restricting representationalism to perceptual experiences is 
indeed ad hoc and poorly motivated, as Byrne and Lycan argue, then the argument about bodily 
sensations and moods will serve as ‘the thin edge of the wedge’, lending some credence to the 
idea that content plays a similar, non-essential role for all experiences. But the main burden of 
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 Byrne (2001, fn.15) cites Tye (1995, 2000) as an utterly unrestricted representationalist, and 
says that “… Dretske, Harman, Lycan, and Shoemaker at least come close.” 
5
 A view that claims simply that (all, some) experiences have content but does not claim that 
content determines phenomenal character is obviously weaker still, and is not generally 
considered a version of representationalism. This view is compatible with the position defended 




argument will be indirect: I will go on in the bulk of the paper to sketch an alternative account of 
perceptual experience according to which content explicitly plays a complex heuristic role.  
  Representationalists have proposed that the pain produced by spraining my ankle means, 
variously, there is tissue damage in the ankle, or the less specific there is a disorder in the ankle 
(Dretske 2003, Tye 2006, Lycan 1996), or don’t put weight on the foot (Klein 2015’s 
‘imperativist’ proposal). These are distinct contents with different satisfaction conditions. One 
might wonder how this issue is to be settled. What non-contentful facts ground the correct 
content attribution? Perhaps a future well-confirmed neuroscientific account of conscious mental 
states would support one of these content attributions over the others.
6
 But the issue here 
concerns the introspectible content of these states, presumably something we can access simply 
by being in these states, and so it is not clear how the attribution of content to sub-personal states 
in cognitive science bears on the content of conscious experience. 
 There is something to be said for each of the competing content proposals. Pain 
attributions do not contain intentional verbs and are not completed by complement clauses (e.g. 
that clauses); nonetheless, pains certainly seem to be telling us something – something is wrong 
with the relevant body part, there is tissue damage there, be careful not to stress it further, and 
so on. But just because a pain (in the typical case) provides the subject with information about 
the state of her body and, moreover, tends to elicit protective behavior, it doesn’t follow that the 
state literally has satisfaction conditions. The idea I propose is that characterizing pains and other 
bodily sensations in contentful terms is simply a useful and natural way of talking about various 
properties of these states. For example, to say that a burning sensation in the finger represents 
tissue damage there is to emphasize the cause of the pain; to say that a sharp pain in the ankle has 
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 Though see Egan 2014, 2018 for argument that content attribution in cognitive science is 




the imperative content don’t put weight on the foot is to highlight the effects of the proscribed 
behavior (that putting weight on the foot will cause further pain and bodily injury).  
 In other words, to the extent that attributing content to pains and other bodily sensations 
is appropriate it is because the attribution plays the role of a gloss on the complex functional role 
(or a salient aspect of that role) of these states. Similarly, for moods: perhaps euphoria can be 
said to represent general wonderfulness (Mendelovici 2014), anxiety to represent a departure 
from functional equilibrium (Tye 1995). One may find these content attributions to moods to be a 
stretch, but, again, to the extent that they are appropriate it is because they serve a variety of 
useful purposes – as with pains, to specify typical causes, but also to suggest associated attitudes 
and emotions, perhaps to predict how the subject will respond to various stimuli, and so on. In 
general, I propose that we think of content attributions to pains and moods as playing a heuristic 
role, rather than construing them as attributing determinate satisfaction conditions to these states. 
Accordingly, the various representationalist proposals would be better construed as attempts to 
justify a particular type of contentful gloss. 
 Let’s return to perceptual experience, the best case for representationalism. Despite its 
intuitive plausibility, it is far from inevitable. In the next section I sketch an alternative proposal.  
 
2. External sortalism: An adverbialist-inspired account of perceptual experience 
So-called adverbial theories of perception, proposed originally by Ducasse (1942) as an antidote 
to sense data theories, rejected the idea that perceptual experiences are to be analyzed as relations 
between an experiencing subject and an entity of some sort. Sense data theories claim that a 
perceptual experience consists in a primitive relation – sensing – between a subject and a special 




is essentially a relation between the subject and the perceived physical object.
7
 
Representationalism holds that a perceptual experience is essentially a relation between a subject 
and the experience’s intentional object. Adverbial theories reject relationalist, or act/object, 
analyses altogether. According to adverbialism, perceptual experiences should be understood as 
episodes of sensing in particular ways. The idea has traditionally been expressed as follows: A 
subject S has a perceptual experience as of a property F if and only if S senses F-ly. For 
example, S has a perceptual experience as of something red if and only if S senses redly. I follow 
Sellars (1956, 1975) and Tye (1984) in understanding sensing F-ly, canonically, as S senses in an 
F manner. For example, S has a perceptual experience as of a red tomato if and only if S senses 
in a red tomato manner. One can sense in an F manner whether or not the property F is in fact 
instantiated nearby, in other words, whether the experience is veridical or illusory. The name 
‘adverbial theory’ designates a family of views, because, as we shall see, ‘sensing in an F 
manner’ can itself be understood in different ways.  
 An initial clarificatory remark is in order. ‘Adverbialism’ is a rather unfortunate name for 
this family of views. Adverbial theories do not treat perceptual experiences as, literally, 
adverbial. Adverb is a linguistic category; it only applies to ways of describing experience. We 
can use adverbs to describe the ways that subjects experience the world, but the ways themselves 
are properties or states of experiencing subjects, not descriptions. The adverbial theory of 
perceptual experience is not a linguistic thesis, though early advocates were not always careful in 
their formulation of the view.
8
 In any event, the view developed here, which is inspired by a 
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 Typically, naive realists hold that the experience is constituted, in part, by the perceived object. 
They must then give a different analysis for hallucinatory experiences. The resulting view goes 
by the name disjunctivism.  
8




particular type of adverbialism, is explicitly not a linguistic thesis, though it does, of course, have 
implications for how perceptual experience attributions are to be understood. I call the view 
external sortalism because it stresses the role of the external world framework in fixing the 
‘ways’ or ‘manners’ that individuate experiential types. The view shares with traditional 
adverbialism a rejection of ‘act/object’ analyses – the idea that experiences are relations of a 
special sort between experiencing subjects and an entity of some kind, whether a perceived 
external object, a content, a private mental object, or something else.
9
  
 One way that adverbialism has traditionally been developed is the ‘sortal’ or ‘topic 
neutral’ view (see Sellars 1956, 1975, Cornman 1971, and Tye 1975, 1984). According to this 
view, S senses in a red square manner is to be understood as follows: S is undergoing the type of 
experience that normally occurs when one is facing a red square in good light with eyes open, 
etc. On this view, predicates such as ‘sensing in a red square manner’ and ‘sensing in a green 
circle manner’ provide a way of sorting experiences into equivalence classes based on their 
normal external causes – red squares and green circles, respectively. Once they are sorted we can 
go on to think and talk about our experiences.  
 The ‘sortal’ idea is developed by Wilfrid Sellars in his classic (1956) paper (sec. 61, 3). 
Here is Tye 1984 channeling Sellars: 
... manners of sensing are conceived of as resembling and differing from one another in 
ways systematically analogous to the ways in which their ‘corresponding’ physical 
objects, i.e. their normal causes, resemble and differ from one another. (43) 
Here is Sellars himself:  
The essential feature of the analogy is that visual impressions stand to one another in a 
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 External sortalism is similar in important respects to Jacobson and Putnam’s (2014) 




system of ways of resembling and differing that is structurally similar to the ways in 
which the colors and shapes of visible objects resemble and differ from one another. 
(1956, 61 (3)) 
The basic idea is that we use the external world as a model for sorting perceptual experiences 
into types, so that we can say, for example, that what I am having right now is a black cat type of 
experience. We can think of the view, schematically, as follows: 
 
 Figure 1 
Figure 1 depicts (at the top) the external world that serves as the model for perceptual 
experience, and (at the bottom) perceptual experience that the external world framework models. 
We can think of the matter, formally, as a mapping between relational structures, perhaps a 
homomorphism. It is in virtue of this shared structure that the external world framework (EW) 









perceptual experiences (PE).  
 It should be noted that when we talk about the ‘external world’ in this context we can’t 
mean anything but the external world as we perceive it – we have no other access to the external 
world except via our sensory-motor interactions with it. But what is relevant is the external world 
as we perceive it over the course of time. The basis for sorting experiences is the external world, 
abstracting away from particular experiences, regularized and stabilized by repeated perceptual 
and motor interactions with the environment, under different lighting conditions, from different 
perspectives, with difference interests and concerns in mind, and so on.
11
  
 There are, of course, lots of questions about how we come, as individuals, to acquire such 
a conception of the external world. The distinction between appearance and reality is something 
that emerges in early childhood. Developmental psychologists tell us that young children come 
to grasp the distinction between appearance and reality only at around age five, consistently 




surrogative reasoning we use a model to reason indirectly but faithfully about relations in the 
modeled domain. The most common example is, of course, from physical measurement. We can 
reason about extensive physical magnitudes such as mass or temperature by reasoning about 
operations on the real numbers used to index or refer to particular quantities of the magnitude, as 
in ‘a mass of 5 kg’ and ‘a temperature of 28 degrees C’.  
11
 Much more could be said about the structure of the external world model, but the project here 
is not to specify its structure; rather, the point is that, whatever that structure is, the structure gets 
exploited in our thinking and talking about perceptual experience. There are likely to be aspects 
of the external world structure that do not get exploited in the application to perceptual 
experience, in the same way that reasoning surrogatively in the real numbers about physical 
magnitudes does not exploit all possible relations defined on the reals. (For example, the notion 
of one object being twice another is not defined for temperature as it is for length.) 
Representationalists about perceptual experience face questions about how rich the content of 
experience is; for example, are high-level causal relations represented in visual experience or are 
only more basic properties such as color, shape, and size represented? On the external sortalism 
account such questions can be understood as questions about which aspects of the external world 
framework are exploited in the application to perceptual experience.      
12




Before grasping the distinction, and more importantly, the idea of a relatively stable external 
reality, children have no (stable) way of categorizing their experiential states.
13
 
 To think of the perceived external world in these terms is to adopt an allocentric 
conception of the world, one in which among the various objects in that world will be 
experiencing subjects, including oneself, standing in relations to other objects. But this 
framework will also include ego-involving relations of the sort “my location being such that 
there is a chair in front of a table’ that can be used to sort my perceptual experience as one of the 
type ‘there is a chair in front of a table’. We can think of the external world framework as made 
up of possible situations or states of affairs constituted by objects and their perceptible properties 
and relations to each other. 
 Let me elaborate the key idea. Perceptible properties bear lots of relations to each other, 
for example, set-theoretic (determinable/determinate) relations – a scarlet car is a species of red 
car; similarity relations – a man’s black shirt is more similar, along the color dimension, to a 
toddler’s navy blue shirt than to a man’s pink shirt, though more similar to the latter along the 
size dimension, and so on. Analogously, visual experiences of cars and visual experiences of 
 
of objects with stable color properties; at age six they do. Children are shown a red car and asked 
what color it is. They respond “red.” A filter is then lowered over the car, making it look black. 
The children are again asked what color the car is. Three year olds say “black”; by six they 
consistently say “red”, indicating that at this age they know that objects have stable colors. 
13
 Flavell (1986) reports: 
It is noted that, while children of 6–7 years manage simple appearance–reality tasks with 
ease, they have great difficulty reflecting on and talking about such appearance–reality 
notions as "looks like," "really and truly," and especially, "looks different from the way it 
really and truly is." Children of 11–12 years, and to an even greater degree college 
students [!], however, give evidence of possessing a substantial body of rich, readily 
available, and explicit knowledge in this area. (418) 
This strongly suggests that while 6-7 year olds have acquired the stable physical object 
framework, at this age they have not yet fully acquired an understanding of perceptual 






shirts stand in roughly the same set-theoretic and similarity relations respectively: a scarlet car 
experience is a species of red car experience, a man’s black shirt experience is more similar 
along one dimension to a child’s navy blue shirt experience than to a man’s pink shirt experience 
and more different from it along another. Our grasp of the similarity and difference relations that 
hold among experiences is parasitic on, and derivative from, our grasp of the similarity and 
difference relations that hold among objects in the world, as perceived by us.  
 We can be non-committal about the entities modeled by the EW framework – perceptual 
experiences (S2 in figure 1) – beyond noting that they are perceptual experience types. They may 
be conceived as properties or occurrent states of subjects, or, alternatively, as events, processes, 
or activities of subjects.
14
 And while the similarities and differences that hold among perceptual 
experiences are similarities and differences in phenomenal character, we will be non-committal 
about the properties (intrinsic or relational) of experiences that account for phenomenal 
character.
15  
 Following early proponents of ‘topic neutral’ adverbialism, external sortalism analyses S 
senses in a red square manner as follows: S is undergoing the type of experience that would 
(ceteris paribus) occur when a normal subject is facing a red square in good light with eyes open, 
etc. But the thesis requires an important qualification. As Jacobson and Putnam (2014) point out, 
it cannot be assumed that all subjects – even all normal subjects – looking at a red square in good 
light will undergo experiences with exactly the same type of phenomenal character. We know, 
for example, that judgments about unique colors differ across subjects. So the expression “the 
type of experience” in the canonical formulation of ES should be understood as designating a 
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 There may, or course, be independent reasons for preferring one or other of these views. 




range of experiences with similar phenomenal characters. The view does not require that my 
experience of a given red square has exactly the same phenomenal character as yours; it requires 
only that our experiences be phenomenally similar.16 It also requires that our experiences occupy 
roughly the same location in the relational structure.
17
  
 Let me say more about how the external world framework is recruited for use in thinking 
and talking about perceptual experience. The sortals made available by the external world are 
applied to experiences by making use of descriptions that advert to what I call their external 
analogues. We say (or think to ourselves) “I see a red tomato” or “I hear thunder.” Normally, the 
point of such talk is to say something about the world, about tomatoes and thunder, but 
occasionally, especially if there is reason to think that things may not be as they seem, the focus 
is one’s own experience.
18
 An obvious but significant point is that the same form of words can 
do double duty, characterizing not only an external state of affairs but also a private mental state. 
In its latter usage, the description functions to pick out the experience by applying a predicate 
that specifies a particular location in a relational experience space (S2 in figure 1), a space that 
shares the same abstract structure as the relational space of the external world model (S1 in 
figure 1). We understand and can apply the scheme to experiences only because we are already 
familiar with external objects and their perceptible properties.
19  
 
16 See the discussion of inverted spectra in the next section for further relevant discussion of this 
point.  
17
 One may wonder how we know that our experiences occupy the same location in the 
relational structure. Overall similarity in our physical constitution makes it highly likely that they 
do, and the smooth communication facilitated by our shared language is evidence that they do.  
18
 As Sellars 1957 noted, ‘looks’ talk is often a way of hedging our descriptions of the external 
world. 
19
 The central idea of external sortalism is supported by the oft-noted transparency of perceptual 




  I have focused on visual experience but auditory and haptic experiences can also be 
characterized by their locations in a relational space structurally similar to auditory and tactile 
properties respectively. Auditory experiences are similar to and different from each other along 
dimensions corresponding to the pitch, volume, and timbre of the sounds that typically cause 
them. Haptic experiences are typically sorted along dimensions structurally similar to the texture, 
shape, size, and temperature of felt objects and substances. Gustatory and olfactory experiences, 
by contrast, are typically sorted in terms of objects that typically cause them – it smells like a 
skunk, it tastes like cilantro. We can articulate structure among tastes along at least four 
dimensions – sweet, sour, bitter, salty – abstracting away from the substances that instantiate 
these properties, but this ability likely develops quite late in children, after the experiences have 
been anchored to the external objects that cause them.
20
 
 The description made available by the experience’s external analogue tells us quite a bit 
about what the experience is like. Once again, the key idea is that a visual experience as of a red 
tomato (that is, an experience of the sort that normally occurs when one is facing a red tomato in 
good light with eyes open) is like a visual experience as of a red fire engine (an experience of the 
sort that normally occurs when facing a red fire engine…) in a particular way and unlike it in 
others. Our facility with the external world framework allows us to use it to reason surrogatively 
about our inner mental states, enabling us to predict and imagine what it would be like to have 
other experiences. Even though I have never seen a pink elephant, I can predict (or imagine) 
 
properties of the experience itself. See Harman 1990. As Jacobson and Putnam 2014 note, 
Reichenbach 1938 makes this point, though he does not use the term ‘transparency.’ 
20




what the experience of seeing one would be like.
21  
 The sortings made available by the external world model are probably not univocal. Most 
times a round coin on a table seen from an oblique angle looks like a round coin on a table; at 
other times, perhaps when we are looking at the coin in reduced light, without knowing it is a 
coin, it may appear ovoid. It may appear ovoid in circumstances where situational features – the 
subject’s location with respect to the perceived object – are particularly salient. And we may be 
able to think ourselves into a situation where the coin appears ovoid by thinking about the 2-D 
projection of the coin on a plane at an oblique angle. This ability is cognitively quite 
sophisticated and likely develops only quite late.
22
  
  External sortalism takes no stand on whether the similarities and differences among 
perceptual experiences, in particular, the similarities and differences among their phenomenal 
characters, hold in virtue of some intrinsic property of experiences. It is simply silent about this. 
The view does not claim that the phenomenal character of a red square experience is constituted 
by the conjunction of a tokening of a phenomenal property – call it e-red
23
 -- and a tokening of a 
phenomenal property e-square. There is no commitment to phenomenal properties or qualia. 
There is certainly no presumption that a visual experience of a red square is itself similar to the 
external object to which it is mapped, what I am calling its external analogue, in this case a red 
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 This doesn’t work as well for smells and tastes, but then our ability to think imaginatively 
about smells and tastes is more limited. See David Lewis’s (1988) discussion of vegemite and 
‘what it’s like.’ 
22
 For recent discussion of perspectival perception see Green and Schellenberg (2017) and Lande 
(2018). 
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 For experiential red, a property of experiences, to distinguish it from red, a property of 




square. Indeed it is hard to even make sense of such an idea.
24
 So the view does not purport to 
explain the phenomenal character of experience, that is, its distinctive phenomenology. The 
sorting provided by the external object framework gives us similarities and differences among 
phenomenal characters; it says nothing about the nature of phenomenal character itself.
25
 This 
may seem to be a failing, but if it is, it is not distinctive of the external sortalism view. No 
philosophical theory of perceptual experience – not representationalism, sense data theory, the 
‘qualia’ version of adverbialism (see next section), nor naive realism – explains phenomenal 
character. None of these theories explain why looking at a red tomato produces an experience 
with its distinctive phenomenal character rather than, say, one with the phenomenal character 
characteristic of a visual experience of green grass; rather they, like external sortalism, simply 
take these facts for granted. In other words, none of these theories close the famous ‘explanatory 
gap.’ 
 To sharpen the point it is useful to focus on sense-data theory for a moment. Proponents 
(e.g. Broad 1923, Robinson 1994) claim to have an explanation of the distinctive phenomenal 
character of experience in virtue of the theory satisfying what Howard Robinson calls the 
Phenomenal Principle, which holds: 
If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular 
sensible quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess 
that quality. (Robinson 1994, 32) 
The idea is that a visual experience as of a red tomato has its distinctive phenomenal character in 
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 Berkeley made this point forcefully in his Essay Toward a New Theory of Vision. 
25
 Howard Robinson (personal communication) has raised this point as an objection to the sortal 
version of adverbialism. Fish (2010, p.45) seems to concur, claiming that the qualia version is 
better placed to explain phenomenal character. But it can hardly be an objection specific to sortal 




virtue of the subject bearing a sensing relation to something – a sense datum – that is itself red 
and tomato-shaped. Moreover, the correspondence is claimed to explain the experience’s 
distinctive phenomenal character.  
 There are several problems with the proposal. In the first place, external physical objects 
and private mental objects are unlikely to have the very same properties (i.e. colors, shapes, 
sizes). Secondly, and more generally, it is not at all clear how positing an inner object with just 
the properties sensed in the experience provides an explanation of the experience’s 
phenomenology. To do so is akin to appealing to a dormitive virtue to ‘explain’ the sleep-
inducing properties of a drug. A similar point applies to the explanatory potential of invoking 
qualia – which just are the phenomenally salient properties of experiences – to explain 
phenomenal character. Looking at a red tomato typically produces in a subject a perceptual 
experience with a particular quale – e-red – but appealing to the quale is merely a way of 
specifying the experience’s phenomenal character and distinguishing it from experiences with e-
green qualia. It is not an explanation of how or why the experience of looking at a tomato has 
that particular phenomenal character. Qualia theories, in respect of their potential to explain 
phenomenal character, are on a par with external sortalism. The appeal to qualia is a wheel 
turning nothing; it simply attaches a label to what we would like explained.  
 There are several advantages to thinking about perceptual experiences in the way 
suggested by external sortalism. In the first place, the view involves no specific metaphysical 
commitments about the mental – it posits no distinctively mental objects and, as I have noted, 




a materialist or a dualist metaphysics.
26 As noted above, it is also non-committal about whether 
experiences are best construed as properties, states, or activities of subjects. 
 Secondly, and more importantly, the view gives us a plausible explanation of how 
children learn to think and talk about experiences, which are, after all, episodes private to the 
experiencing subject. (I am not here assuming that experiences are private in the sense that the 
subject has authoritative or privileged access to them, as these notions are generally understood.) 
External objects and their properties are publicly accessible, and although the details are 
complex, there is no inherent mystery about how we learn to talk to each other about them. Our 
ways of thinking and talking about our experiences are parasitic on public object thought and 
talk. As Sellars (1956) pointed out, reports of mental states have a dual character: (1) they are 
reports of episodes that are private; and (2) they are part of public discourse and hence 
intelligible to others. External sortalism makes this duality less puzzling.
27
  
 External sortalism differs from traditional adverbialism in several important respects.  
(1) As noted above, it is not primarily a linguistic thesis about the logical form of perceptual 
experience attributions. Hence the name adverbialism is misleading. However, in analyzing 
perceptual experience attributions as follows: “S is having a perceptual experience as of a red 
square if and only if S is experiencing in a red square manner” and this, canonically, as “S is 
undergoing the type of experience that would (ceteris paribus) occur when a normal subject is 
facing a red square in good light, with eyes open, etc.” the terms (“red, “square” etc.) that specify 
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 Proponents of early versions of adverbialism made a similar point about their view, and 
claimed it as an advantage over sense data theory, with the latter’s commitment to 
metaphysically problematic private objects. See Smart’s (1959) account of his ‘topic neutral’ 
analyses. 
27
 There is much to be said about the role of language in regularizing experience, but this is 




the ‘manners’ have their ordinary meaning. Compositionality of experiential attributions is 
therefore preserved. The ‘manners’ so specified can be arbitrarily complex.  
 Moreover, external sortalism, unlike some versions of adverbialism, has no trouble 
accounting for the validity of inferences such as “S is having a red square experience, therefore S 
is having a red experience”, since the set of experiences that would occur when one is facing a 
red square (with eyes open, etc.) is a proper subset of the set of experiences that would occur 
when one is facing something red (with eyes open, etc.). We get these inferences from set-
theoretic relations. And the set-theoretic relations that hold among perceptual experiences are 
grounded in the set-theoretic relations that hold among their external analogues: the set of red 
square things is a proper subset of the set of red things. So the determinable/determinate relations 
that hold among perceptual experiences are not brute. 
 (2) External sortalism does not construe the modifier in perceptual experience attributions (the 
manners) as modifying (i.e. attributing some property to) experiences in the way that traditional 
adverbialism does (e.g. redly, squarely…). As I have stressed, what is attributed to the 
experience is a location in a relational structure, not any intrinsic properties that would explain 
why these similarities and differences hold. As we shall see in the next section, this point will be 
significant for external sortalism’s potential to avoid a notorious problem faced by traditional 
versions of adverbialism.  
 
3. Objections and replies 
(1) The many properties problem 
Objection:  Adverbial theories of perceptual experience suffer from what Jackson (1975) called 




According to adverbialism, you are sensing redly, squarely, greenly, and circularly. But an 
experience of a red circle and a green square is also an instance of sensing redly, squarely, 
greenly, and circularly. In rejecting the idea that perceptual experience is a relation between a 
subject and objects of perception, adverbialism appears to lack the resources to distinguish 
different ways that sensed properties can be bound together in distinct experiences. 
Reply: According to ES, to sense in a red square and a green circle manner is to undergo the type 
of experience that would (ceteris paribus) occur when facing a red square and a green circle, in 
good light with eyes open, etc. To sense in a red circle and a green square manner is to undergo 
the type of experience that would (ceteris paribus) occur when facing a red circle and a green 
square. The external situations or states of affairs that normally cause the two experiences and 
that provide the basis for sorting the experiences into types are distinct. These situations occupy 
distinct locations in the relational structure (the EW framework) that serves as a model for 
conceptualizing perceptual experiences. The fact that both experiences can be described as a 
sensing redly, squarely, greenly, and circularly is irrelevant; this is not the canonical 
characterization of the experiences given by ES. ES does not face a binding problem because, 
unlike the qualia version of adverbialism, ES does not treat perceptual experiences as constituted 
by conjunctions of phenomenal properties or qualia – in this case e-red, e-square, e-green, e-
circular – that correspond to the perceptible properties of perceived objects and that must be 
bound together in the right way.
28
 The external states of affairs that provide the basis for sorting 
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 The qualia version of adverbialism construes the properties sensed in perceptual experience to 
be properties of experience itself, i.e. qualia. Crane and French (2015) argue as follows:  
The adverbial theory is committed to the view that experiencing something red, for 
example, involves one’s experience being modified in a certain way: experiencing redly. 
The most natural way to understand this is that the experience is an event, and the 
modification of it is a property of that event. Since this property is both intrinsic (as 




experiences are constituted by observable objects that come with their perceptible properties 





(2) The many relations problem 
Objection: A recently noted variant on the many properties problem (see Dinges 2015) is thought 
to be particularly challenging for adverbial accounts. Imagine that you are looking at a red object 
that is brighter than a green one and to the right of a blue one. The challenge for the adverbialist 
is to characterize this experience, as opposed to an experience of a red object that is brighter than 
a green one, but where it is the green object that is to the right of the blue one. It isn’t clear that 
adverbialism has the resources to distinguish experiences where the relations are distributed 
differently among the objects.   
Reply: External sortalism handles multiple relations in the same way as multiple properties. In 
the imagined case, I am undergoing the type of experience that normally occurs when I am 
facing a red object that is brighter than a green one and to the right of a blue one (with my eyes 
open, etc.). This is a distinct experience from the type of experience I have when facing a red 
object that is brighter than a green one where it is the green object that is to the right of the blue 
one. The two states of affairs occupy distinct locations in the external world framework (EW); 
 
then this way of understanding the adverbial theory is committed to the existence of 
qualia. (sec.3.2) 
Whether or not qualia-adverbialism is the most natural construal of the original thesis, it is 
distinct from sortal-adverbialism. Fish 2010 suggests that the qualia version has an explanatory 
advantage over sortal versions because it is better placed to explain phenomenal character. I 
argued in section 2 that the alleged explanatory advantage of appeal to qualia is an illusion.  
29
 Kriegel (2008) appeals to determinate/determinable relations among modes of sensing – 
qualia – to solve the ‘many properties’ problem, but unless these relations are parasitic on 
external object and property relations they are problematically brute. See Grzankowski (2017) 




analogously the two experiences occupy distinct locations in the experiential space modelled by 
the external framework. Once again, the external world does the work of grounding the 
differences between distinct types of perceptual experiences. 
 
 (3) External sortalism is problematically circular 
Objection: The external world framework (EW) is acquired from perceptual experience. External 
sortalism claims that we then go on to conceptualize perceptual experience in terms of the EW 
framework. But this looks to be circular – we are sorting perceptual experience in terms of itself.  
Reply: Infants discriminate, via perception, red things from green things, squares from circles, 
and so on. Later, they go on to conceptualize the similarities and differences among physical 
objects in terms of stable properties such as color, size, and shape. This process involves 
abstraction and generalization from what is learned from particular experiences, but the external 
world framework is acquired without the child making use of mentalistic notions such as 
‘experience’ or ‘the way things look’.
30
 Finally, children go on to apply the EW framework to 
their mental states. There is no circularity here. As the above discussion of the appearance/reality 
distinction strongly suggests, the perceptual experience framework (S2 in Figure 1) is not 
acquired until after the child has mastered the EW framework (S1) to which it is structurally 
similar. Thus external sortalism provides an explanation of the oft-noted transparency of 
perceptual experience, the fact that when we focus on what a perceptual experience is like we 









(4) External sortalism doesn’t account for the possibility of inverted spectra 
Objection: In characterizing perceptual experience in terms of its normal external causes ES 
doesn’t leave room for the possibility that two subjects may be spectrally inverted with respect to 
each other. ES treats two subjects undergoing a perceptual experience caused by looking at 
something red as undergoing the same type of experience even though one subject may in fact be 
having an experience phenomenally indistinguishable from the experience that the other has 
when looking at something green. The view seems to give the wrong verdict about inverted 
spectra cases.  
Reply: ES analyses S senses redly, or S senses in a red manner as follows: S is undergoing the 
type of experience that would (ceteris paribus) occur when a normal subject is facing something 
red in good light with eyes open, etc. If S is an inverted subject then she has that type of 
experience when she (S) is facing something green. But that just is the type of experience that 
normal subjects undergo when facing something red.31 So ES gets inverted spectra cases right.  
 ES characterizes perceptual experience by tacking it down to the types of experiences had 
by subjects like us when in causal contact with publicly observable objects and properties. This 
apparatus allows us, as subjects of perceptual experience, but also as philosophical theorists of 
perceptual experience, to refer to a class of phenomenally similar perceptual experiences, while 
saying nothing about what gives perceptual experiences their phenomenal character. This same 
apparatus allows the formulation of the inverted spectra scenario: inverted subjects differ from 
normal subjects only in very specific and systematic ways, and those ways are characterized by 
reference to publicly observable objects and properties (e.g. looking at something green). And so 
 
31 Recall the above qualification that the expression “the type of experience” in the canonical 
formulation of ES should be understood as designating a range of experiences with similar 




ES handles inverted cases smoothly.  
 ES has nothing to say about subjects whose perceptual experiences are radically different 
from our own. There is no reason to think that different species or alien life forms will satisfy the 
left hand side of the EW schema, that they will share our ways or manners of sensing. There is 
no reason to think that they will sense in a red square manner, that is, that they will have the sort 
of experience that we have when looking at a red square. It is appropriate that the theory is silent 
about such subjects; we have no idea what it would be like to undergo their experiences. But 
whatever their perceptual experiences are like, it is highly likely that they can be sorted in terms 
of the objects and properties that are observable for them, whatever these objects and properties 
are, thus enabling them to talk and reason surrogatively about their experiences, as we can about 
ours. In other words, the general picture and underlying motivation for ES, in particular, the idea 
that the external world framework (S1 in figure 1) can serve as a model for perceptual experience 
(S2) in virtue of the shared structure of the two domains, will apply to alien experience as well. 
 
4. The role of representational content in external sortalism 
So far nothing has been said about experiences having representational content. In 
understanding perceptual experiences as episodes of sensing in particular ways, traditional 
adverbialism does not construe perceptual experiences as representational, i.e. as having 
content.
32
 To have content is to be assessable for accuracy.
33
 We talk about Macbeth 
 
32
 Fish 2010 characterizes the two general types of adverbial theories (sortal and qualia theories) 
as explicitly rejecting the idea that perceptual experiences are representational. Though Siegel 
(2016, sec.2.1) observes that “…so long as the core thesis of adverbialism is that experiences are 
modifications or properties of the subject, adverbialism leaves open whether experiences are 
assessable for accuracy or not. For all that core thesis says, being appeared-to F-ly could be a 
way of representing that something is F.” In other words, adverbialism leaves open whether 




hallucinating a dagger, a stick immersed in water looking bent, Muller-Lyer lines looking, 
incorrectly, to be different lengths, and so on. An adequate philosophical account of perceptual 
experience should account for the fact that we sometimes classify perceptual experiences as 
accurate or inaccurate. External sortalism can account for this feature of our ordinary practice, 
though it denies (i) the representationalist claim that content determines the phenomenal 
character of experience, and (ii) the idea that having accuracy conditions (i.e. content) is a deep, 




 Moreover, orthodox representationalism requires an account of how perceptual 
experiences get their content. External sortalism already has such an account. Recall the above 
point that sortals are applied to experiences by making use of descriptions that advert to their 
external analogues, descriptions such as “I see a red tomato.” One could take the description to 
specify a content – an accuracy condition – that is satisfied just in case there is a red tomato in 
front of one causing the experience. To make this move is to treat perceptual experiences as 
representing (and occasionally misrepresenting) the objects and properties in the external world 
model that provide the basis for classifying them. This is to take a description whose primary 
function is to characterize the experience in terms of its location in a relational space to, in 
addition, specify an accuracy condition. Suppose that I am currently undergoing the type of 
experience that normally occurs when facing a red tomato in good light with eyes open, etc. I can 
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 As Crane puts it, “… to say that a state has content is just to say that it represents the world as 
being a certain way. It thus has… a ‘correctness condition’ – the condition under which it 
represents the world accurately.” (1992, 139) 
34
 So the view comports very naturally with the deflationary account of representational content 




consider whether on this occasion there actually is such an object in front of me causing the 
experience. If there is, then the experience is veridical; if not, it is illusory. 
 Perception, of course, is our principal way of cognitively accessing the world, and is the 
basis for many of our beliefs about the world. Construing perceptual experiences as having 
content outfits them to serve our epistemological purposes. We can consider whether my red 
tomato visual experience – the experience characterized by reference to its external analogue (a 
red tomato with a particular size, shape, etc.) – justifies my current belief that there is a red 
tomato in front of me. 
 The way of thinking about content suggested by ES is well-motivated. It is highly likely 
that it is the overall relational structure of experience that makes a representational construal 
possible. There is no basis for positing a resemblance relation between experiences and their 
external analogues, a relation which, were it to hold, might serve to underwrite a claim that a given 
experience, considered in isolation from other experiences to which it bears various similarity and 
difference relations, represents its external analogue. It is the structural similarity between external 
objects and their perceptible properties on the one hand and perceptual experiences on the other 
that underpins our representational capacities – that makes us, qua perceivers, generally reliable 
about the world.
35
 It is only against this background structure that we can assess individual 
locations in the relational space of experiences for accuracy. Without a system of shape and color 
experiences, no single shape or color experience has content or is accessible for accuracy; 
without a system of shape and color experiences, an experience would not count as a shape or 
color experience at all. The relational structure of experience grounds its representational status, 
as external sortalism makes explicit. 
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5. Summary and conclusion 
 To recap: (1) The predicates made available by the external object framework enable us 
to conceptualize, talk, and reason surrogatively about our perceptual experience. They give us a 
handle on something that is private – the phenomenal character of experience – by situating the 
experience in a relational space of similarities and differences made available to us by the 
external world model (S1 in figure 1). My experience is private in the sense that it is mine, but 
not that it cannot be had by others. We have all had the perceptual experience produced by 
having a red tomato in front of us. 
 (2) The predicates can be treated as content attributions, in other words, as specifying accuracy 
conditions, allowing me to evaluate whether, for example, on this occasion my sensing in a red 
tomato manner is actually caused by a red tomato – the experience’s external analogue – and so 
warrants the belief that there is a red tomato in front of me. This is an option that has an extrinsic 
motivation, viz. serving our various epistemological purposes. 
(3) But on the view I am defending content neither determines phenomenal character, as 
representationalists claim, nor explains it. The content attribution simply characterizes it, 
indirectly, by picking out the experience’s location in a relational space structurally similar to 
that occupied by external objects, as presented in perceptual experience. And this job can be 
done without construing perceptual experience as representational or contentful, simply by 
deploying external sortals (i.e. what I am calling ‘external analogues’). 
 I have identified a further respect in which external sortalism differs from traditional 
adverbialism: there is a sense in which experiences bear a relation to their external analogues – to 




‘metaphysically weighty’ or substantive about this relation. We can call it a representation 
relation if we like, but this is to be understood in a very thin sense.  
 In conclusion, attribution of content to perceptual experience, like the attribution of 
content to pains and moods, is best construed as a kind of gloss, a way of adverting to the 
experience’s external analogue that plays an essential role in characterizing the experience. 
Content plays a complex heuristic role in our various expository and epistemic practices but 
should not be construed as specifying an essential or metaphysically deep property of experience. 
 
References 
Berkeley, G. (1910), A New Theory of Vision and Other Writings, (London: J.M. Dent 
& Sons Ltd. First published 1709). 
Broad, C. D. (1923). Scientific Thought, Harcourt, Brace and Company, New York. 
Byrne, A. (2001), “Intentionalism Defended”, The Philosophical Review, 110, 199– 
240. 
Chalmers, D. (1995), “Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 2: 200-219. 
Cornman, J.W. (1971), Materialism and Sensations (New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press). 
Crane, T. (1992) “The Nonconceptual Content of Experience,” in T. Crane (ed.), The 
Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press), pp. 136–157. 
Crane, T. (2000) “The Origins of Qualia” in T. Crane and S. Patterson (eds.), The History 




Crane, T. and French, C. (2015), “The Problem of Perception,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
Dinges, A. (2015), “The Many-Relations Problem for Adverbialism,” Analysis 75(2): 231–237. 
Dretske, F. (2003) “Experience as Representation” in E. Villanueva (ed.), Philosophical 
Issues 13: Philosophy of Mind (Atascadero: Ridgeview), pp. 67–82. 
Ducasse, C.J. (1942) “Moore’s Refutation of Idealism,” in Schlipp (ed.), The 
Philosophy of G.E. Moore, Vol. I (La Salle, Ill: Open Court), pp. 225–251. 
Egan, F. (2014), “How to Think about Mental Content”, Philosophical Studies. 170 (2014), 115-
135. 
Egan, F. (2018), “The Nature and Function of Content in Computational Models,” in The 
Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind, Matteo Colombo and Mark Sprevak 
(eds.), Routledge, 247-258. 
Fish, W. (2010), Philosophy of Perception: A Contemporary Introduction, Routledge. 
Flavell, J. (1986), “The Development of Children's Knowledge about the Appearance–Reality 
Distinction,” American Psychologist, 41(4), 418-425. 
Flavell, J., Green, F., Flavell, E. (1986), “Development of Knowledge about the Appearance-
Reality Distinction”, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 
51(1): 1-87. 
Green, E.J. and Schellenberg, S. (2017). “Spatial Perception: The Perspectival Aspect of 
Perception,” Philosophy Compass, https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12472. 
Grzankowski, A. (2017). “The Determinable-Determinate Relation Can’t Save Adverbialism,” 
Analysis, 78 (1) 45-52. 




Philosophical Perspectives 4: Action Theory and the Philosophy of Mind, Atascadero, 
CA: Ridgeview, 31-52. 
Jackson, F. (1975) “On the Adverbial Analysis of Visual Experience,” Metaphilosophy 
 6(2): 127–135. 
Jacobson, H. and Putnam, H. (2014), “The Needlessness of Adverbialism, Attributeism 
 and its Compatibility with Cognitive Science,” Philosophia, 42: 555–570.  
Klein, C. (2015), What the Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain, Cambridge, 
 MA: MIT Press. 
Kriegel, U. (2008), “The dispensability of (merely) intentional objects,” Philosophical Studies, 
141: 79–95. 
Lande, K. (2018), “The Perspectival Character of Perception,” The Journal of Philosophy, 115: 
187-214. 
Levine, J. (1983). “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical 
Quarterly, 64: 354-361. 
Lewis, D. (1988). “What Experience Teaches,” Proceedings of the Russellian Society, University 
of Sydney, 13: 29–57. 
Lycan, W. (1996), 1996. Consciousness and Experience, Cambridge, MA: Bradford: MIT Press. 
Lycan, W. (2015), “Representational Theories of Consciousness,” Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. 
Matthews, R. (2007), The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mendelovici, A. (2014), “Pure Intentionalism about Moods and Emotions,” in Uriah  Kriegel 




McGee, H. (2020), Nose Dive: A Field Guide to the World’s Smells, New York: Penguin Press. 
Morrison, J. (2020), “Perceptual Variation and Structuralism,” Nous 54, 290-326. 
Papineau, D. (2014), “Sensory Experience and Representational Properties,” Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society (presidential address), 114: 1-33. 
Reichenbach, H. (1938), Experience and Prediction. An Analysis of the Foundations and the 
Structure of Knowledge. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Robinson, H. (1994), Perception, London: Routledge. 
Sellars, W. (1956) “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind,” in H. Feigl (ed.), 
 Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. I (Minneapolis, Minn.: 
 University of Minnesota Press), pp. 307–329. 
Sellars, W. (1975) “The Adverbial Theory of the Objects of Sensation,” Metaphilosophy 
 6(2): 144–160. 
Siegel, S. (2016), “The Contents of Perception,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  
Smart, J.J.C. (1959) “Sensations and Brain Processes,” The Philosophical Review 
 68(2): 141–156. 
Smith, B.C. (2015), “The Chemical Senses,” The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Perception, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 314-352. 
Swoyer, C. (1991), “Structural Representation and Surrogative Reasoning,” Synthese 87: 449-
508. 
Tye, M. (1975), “The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars against Jackson,” 
 Metaphilosophy 6(2): 136–143. 
Tye, M. (1984). “The adverbial approach of visual experience,” The Philosophical 




Tye, M. (1995), Ten Problems of Consciousness, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Tye, M. (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
11/21 
